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When explaining and tackling employers participating in the informal economy, they have been 
conventionally viewed as rational economic actors who engage when the benefits outweigh the 
costs, and thus their participation is deterred by increasing the sanctions and/or risks of 
detection. An emergent social actor approach, however, has explained employers as engaging 
in the informal economy when there is a lack of vertical trust (i.e., their norms, values and 
beliefs are not in symmetry with the laws and regulations) and horizontal trust (i.e., they believe 
many others are being non-compliant). The aim of this paper is to evaluate these competing 
perspectives by reporting a 2015 survey of 450 employers in FYR Macedonia. The finding is 
that although there is no association between employers using unregistered workers and the 
perceived level of penalties and risks of detection, there is a strong significant association with 
both the level of vertical and horizontal trust. Those whose beliefs do not align with the laws 
and regulations display a significantly greater likelihood of employing unregistered workers, as 
do those who perceive a larger proportion of the population to be engaged in the informal 
economy. The theoretical and policy implications are then discussed.    
   




The aim of this paper is to explain why employers use unregistered workers and how this illegal 
employment practice can be tackled. The conventional dominant explanation is that employers 
are rational economic actors who employ workers without a written contract or terms of 
employment when the pay-off is greater than the expected cost of being caught and punished 
(Allingham and Sandmo 1972). To tackle this illegitimate practice, therefore, the policy 
approach is to increase the actual or perceived penalties and probability of detection. Over the 
past decade, however, an alternative social actor approach has emerged. Grounded in 
institutional theory (North 1990), this has explained employers use of unregistered workers as 
occurring when there is a lack of “vertical trust”, measured by a non-alignment between the 
norms, values and beliefs of employers and the laws and regulations of the formal institutions 
(Alm et al. 2010; Cummings et al. 2009; Kirchler 2007; Murphy 2008; Torgler, 2007; Williams 
and Horodnic, 2015a,b). The policy approach is therefore to align the informal institutions (i.e., 
the norms, values and beliefs of citizens) with the laws and regulations of the formal institutions 
(Alm et al. 2012; Alm and Torgler 2011; Torgler 2012; Williams and Horodnic 2016a,b). In 
recent years, moreover, this social actor approach has started to additionally view employers as 
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using unregistered workers when they lack horizontal trust that other employers are operating 
in a compliant manner (Baric 2016; Williams et al. 2017). The solution is therefore to improve 
vertical and horizontal trust. In this paper, the intention is to evaluate these competing ways of 
explaining and tackling employers use of unregistered workers.    
 This issue of tackling unregistered employment is currently high on the political agenda 
in Central and Eastern Europe and well beyond, exemplified by the European Commission 
establishing the European Platform Tackling Undeclared Work (European Commission 2016) 
and the International Labour Organisation passing Recommendation 208 (ILO 2015) to deal 
with this problem. The reason it is high on the political agenda is because employers who 
employ workers without written contracts or terms of employment not only reduce the ability 
of the state to protect the quality of working conditions, but it also weakens trade union and 
collective bargaining, and exerts pressure on businesses acting legitimately to themselves 
employ unregistered workers to deal with the unfair competition they witness (Andrews et al. 
2011; Williams 2014).  
To advance understanding of how this phenomenon can be explained and tackled, 
therefore, section 2 reviews the previous literature on unregistered employment and draws upon 
the study of the wider informal economy to develop hypotheses on how to explain and tackle 
this illegal practice of unregistered employment. To test these hypotheses, section 3 then reports 
the data used, namely the 2015 GREY survey of employers in FYR Macedonia, involving 450 
face-to-face interviews. Section 4 reports the findings regarding the validity of the different 
ways of explaining and tackling unregistered employment, while section 5 summarises the 
theoretical and policy implications.  
 
Explaining and tackling unregistered employment: theoretical framing and hypotheses 
development 
 
The informal economy refers to paid work that is not unregistered by, or not declared to, the 
authorities for tax, social security and/or labour purposes (Khan 2017; Slack et al. 2017; 
Williams 2017; Williams and Windebank 1998; Windebank and Horodnic 2017). A form of 
waged work which is wholly undeclared and unregistered is unregistered employment, which 
is paid work without a legal written contract or terms of employment. This is the focus of this 
paper. Other work in the informal economy includes employers not declaring some or all their 
income and formal employers evading paying their full tax and social contributions on their 
formal employees by paying some of their salary as an official declared wage and the rest as an 
undeclared (envelope) wage (ILO 2015; Williams 2017).  
Although the informal economy as a whole has been subject to widespread evaluation 
in recent years (for a review, see Williams & Schneider 2016), unregistered employment has 
received little attention. The exceptions are Hazans (2011) and Williams and Kayaoglu (2017), 
who both evaluate its prevalence and distribution. Williams and Kayaoglu (2017) find that in 
the European Union, 5 per cent of employees report being in unregistered employment in 2013, 
while Hazans (2011), using European Social Survey data on 30 countries for the period between 
2004 and 2009, finds that the proportion of employees without a contract is 2.7% in Nordic 
countries, 9.5% in Southern Europe, and 5 per cent in Western and East-Central Europe. 
Analysing its distribution, Williams and Kayaoglu (2017) find no significant association 
between various socio-demographic and socio-economic factors (i.e., gender, age, educational 
level, and occupational status), although Hazans (2011) finds that unregistered employment is 
more likely among those with fewer years in education, students, women, and that older and 
younger employees more likely to work without a contract.  
Both these studies of unregistered employment, like most studies of the wider informal 
economy, are based on employee surveys. Few employer surveys have been conducted. This is 
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particularly important when evaluating the validity of policy approaches for tackling 
unregistered employment, and the informal economy more widely. Overall, it is employers, 
rather than employees, who decide whether an employee should have a written contract or not, 
and it is employers, not employees, who are penalised if caught (Williams 2018). Indeed, this 
is also the case in FYR Macedonia, which is the focus of this paper (Mojsoska Blazevski and 
Williams 2018). Until now, however, studies of unregistered employment and the wider 
informal economy have only evaluated whether employees are rational economic actors or 
social actors (Horodnic and Williams 2018; Williams and Franic 2016; Williams and Kayaoglu 
2017; Williams and Besnik 2018). More important when explaining and tackling unregistered 
employment, and the wider informal economy, is whether employers are rational economic 
actors or social actors. Here, therefore, each way of explaining and tackling informality is here 
reviewed and hypotheses developed.        
 The view that employers using unregistered workers are “rational economic actors” has 
its contemporary roots in the seminal work of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) which views them 
as doing so when the benefits are greater than the costs. The policy solution therefore, is to 
ensure that the costs outweigh the benefits. This is pursued by firstly increasing the actual and/or 
the perceived risk of detection and secondly, the actual and/or perceived level of penalties for 
those caught. This is currently the dominant policy approach pursued by governments in Central 
and Eastern Europe and beyond (Williams and Puts 2017; ILO 2017). Indeed, this is also the 
dominant policy approach in FYR Macedonia where the emphasis of the tax administration and 
labour inspectorate when tackling unregistered employment and the wider informal economy 
is on increasing the penalties and risks of detection, to ensure that the costs outweigh the 
benefits (Mojsoska Blazevski and Williams 2018). 
When analysing the findings of surveys of unregistered employees, however, the 
findings are not conclusive that this is a rational economic decision on their part. Analysing 
previous employee surveys, the finding is that while some confirm that the likelihood of 
participation in unregistered employment and the wider informal economy is significantly 
lower when the levels of penalties and risks of detection are higher (Feld and Frey 2002; Mas’ud 
et al. 2015; Mazzolini et al. 2017), others find no significant association (Hartl et al. 2015; 
Shaw et al, 2008; Williams and Franic 2015, 2016), and yet others that increasing the actual 
and/or perceived deterrents leads to greater non-compliance (Chang and Lai 2004; Hofmann et 
al. 2017; Kaplanoglou and Rapano, 2015; Murphy 2005, 2008; Murphy and Harris 2007). 
Given that employees are not penalised if caught working unregistered, this is not surprising. 
 Analysing the few employer surveys conducted, however, the results are again 
inconclusive. While in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, the finding is that the higher the risk of 
detection and the penalty, the lower the tax evasion and misreporting by employers (Putniņš 
and Sauka 2017), in Moldova and Romania no significant relationship is identified (Putniņš et 
al. 2018). In Greece, meanwhile, the finding in a sample of small and medium-size enterprises 
is that the coercive power of authorities has a negative effect on both intended tax compliance 
and voluntary tax compliance, and yet a positive effect on enforced tax compliance 
(Kaplanoglou et al. 2016). However, and despite previous studies of both employees and 
employers being inconclusive about the association between non-compliance and the level of 
penalties and risks of detection, this rational economic actor approach remains dominant. Thus, 
the following hypothesis will be tested:  
 
Rational economic actor hypothesis (H1): the higher are the perceived penalties and risks 
of detection, the lower the likelihood of employers using unregistered workers, ceteris 
paribus. 




H1b: the higher are the perceived risks of detection, the lower the likelihood of 
employers using unregistered workers. 
 
Since the turn of the millennium, it has started to be recognised that many employers and 
employees do not participate in the informal economy even when the benefit/cost ratio suggests 
they should (Alm et al. 2010; Kirchler 2007; Murphy 2008; Murphy and Harris 2007). The 
outcome has been the emergence of a “social actor” approach. This argues that many are 
compliant even when it would be rational for them to be non-compliant because they self-
regulate themselves (Alm and Torgler 2006, 2011; Cummings et al. 2009; McKerchar et al. 
2013; Torgler 2011; Torgler and Schneider 2007).  
 This approach has its origins in the work of Georg von Schanz (1890) who argued that 
a tax contract exists between the state and its citizens, which some six decades later, was further 
advanced by the German “Cologne school of tax psychology” (see Schmölders 1952, 1960, 
1962; Strümpel 1969) which viewed the breakdown of this contract as a primary determinant 
of tax non-compliance (Schmölders 1960). Following the ascendancy of the rational economic 
actor approach from the 1970s, this approach receded. However, over the past decade or so, it 
has re-emerged (Alm et al. 2012; Kirchler 2007; Torgler 2007, 2011). The outcome has been 
calls to improve the trust of citizens in the state so that voluntary compliance will result (Alm 
and Torgler 2011; Torgler 2012; Williams 2014; Williams 2017).  
As such and drawing inspiration from institutional theory (Helmke and Levistky 2004; 
North 1990), an alternative way of tackling unregistered employment and the wider informal 
economy has re-emerged (Williams and Horodnic 2015a; Williams et al. 2015). From this 
institutionalist perspective, all societies have formal institutions, which are laws and regulations 
defining the legal rules of the game, and informal institutions, which are the “socially shared 
rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated and enforced outside of officially 
sanctioned channels” (Helmke and Levitsky 2004, 727). Unregistered employment thus arises 
when there is a lack of vertical trust (measured by the gap between the formal institutions and 
informal institutions). When vertical trust is lower, the prevalence of unregistered employment 
will be higher (cf. Kistruck et al. 2015; Webb et al. 2009). The greater the lack of vertical trust, 
the more prevalent will be unregistered employment (cf. Williams and Horodnic 2015a,b).  
Analysing employees’ views of the formal rules of the game, this has been confirmed 
regardless of the type of informal work considered. A direct link has been identified between 
the level of vertical trust and working without contract (Williams and Horodnic 2015b, 2016a; 
Windebank and Horodnic 2017) as well as salary under-reporting (Williams and Horodnic 
2015a, 2017b). Turning to the few surveys of employers rather than employees, again a link 
has been identified between the level of income and wage underreporting and tolerance to tax 
evasion in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (Putniņš and Sauka 2017) as well as in Romania and 
Moldova (Putniņš et al. 2018).  
 In the past few years, furthermore, it has been asserted to be not just the lack of vertical 
trust (i.e., formal/informal institutional asymmetry) that leads to informality, but also the lack 
of horizontal trust that others are being compliant (Baric, 2016; Williams et al. 2017). When 
employers perceive that a large majority of their competitors are not adhering to the formal 
rules of the game, then the argument is that they too decide to do so. Indeed, the lower the level 
of horizontal trust (i.e., the greater the perceived propensity of other employers to be non-
compliant), the greater will be likelihood that employers will be themselves non-compliant. To 
evaluate the validity of this social actor approach towards explaining and tackling employers 
use of unregistered workers, therefore, the following hypothesis can be evaluated: 
 
Social actor hypothesis (H2): the greater the level of vertical and horizontal trust, the 
lower is the likelihood of employers using unregistered workers. 
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H2a: the greater is the level of vertical trust, the lower the likelihood of employers using 
unregistered workers. 




To evaluate these two contrasting ways of explaining and tackling unregistered employment, 
we here use data from a representative business survey conducted in 2015 in FYR Macedonia, 
a country with one of the highest levels of informal work in Europe (Medina and Schneider 
2018). The sampling methodology ensured that the samples are proportionate to the universe in 
each country with respect to firm size, region and sector. The owners or managers of a 
representative sample of 450 businesses were surveyed.  
Given the nature of the topic, and to build up rapport with the participants, the survey 
adopted a gradual approach to the more sensitive questions. The interview schedule thus started 
by asking the employers about their satisfaction with the business environment, followed by 
questions on the acceptability of some uncompliant behaviours and only then questions 
regarding whether they consider they are affected by the existence of the businesses which 
employ informal practices and their engagement in such practices. Examining the responses of 
the interviewers regarding their perceived reliability of the interviews, in 94 per cent of cases, 
interviewers reported excellent or fair cooperation from the employers. Cooperation was bad, 
or the interviewer did not assess the perceived reliability of the interviews in only 1 per cent of 
cases.  
To evaluate the hypotheses, we here use ordered logit regression analysis. The 
dependent variable is a categorical variable showing how often employers hire a worker without 
a contract: 1 = never, 2 = sometimes, 3 = in most cases, 4 = always.  
To evaluate whether there is an association between employers hiring unregistered 
workers without a written contract or terms of employment, and the two types of policy 
approach, four key explanatory variables are used. On the one hand, the two variables 
investigating the elements of the “rational economic actor” approach are:  
 Detection risk: A categorical variable describing respondent's estimation about the 
probability that the typical company in his/her industry would be caught if the company 
was to underreport its number of employees: 1 = less than 30%, 2 = 30 to 60%, 3 = more 
than 60%. 
 Expected sanction: A categorical variable measuring anticipated penalties when the 
company were caught for deliberately misreporting: 1=nothing serious or a small fine, 
2=a serious fine that would affect the competitiveness of the company, 3=a serious fine 
that would put the company at risk of insolvency, 4=the company would be forced to 
cease operations. 
On the other hand, the two variables investigating the vertical and horizontal trust elements 
respectively of the “social actor” approach are:  
 Tax morale: A categorical variable recorded using the following survey question - To 
what extent do you agree with the statements that underreporting annual revenue or 
turnover to evade taxes is acceptable. This variable is measured on a 10-point Likert 
scale, 1 means completely disagree, 10 means completely agree. Thus, the lower the tax 
morale index value, the higher is the tax morale, and vice versa 
 Estimated share: A categorical variable describing the respondent's estimation of the 
overall share of the informal economy in his/her country: 1=less than 10%, 2=10 to 
20%, 3=21 to 30%, 4=31 to 50%, 5=50% or more. 
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A series of individual-level and firm-level variables extracted from previous studies analysing 
the likelihood of participation in the informal economy (Ali and Najman, 2018; Hudson et al. 
2012; Putniņš and Sauka 2017; Putniņš et al. 2018; Williams et al. 201) are used as control 
variables as detailed below. 
 Sector: A categorical variable describing the main activity of the company: 
1=agriculture, 2=hotels and restaurants, 3=services, 4=construction, 5=transport and 
communications, 6=trade, 7=retail, 8=industry, 9=health, 10=other. 
 Number of employees: A categorical variable describing the total number of currently 
employed people in the observed company (excluding owners and partners): 1=sole 
proprietor’s and micro (0-9 employees), 2=small (10-49 employees), 3=medium and 
large (50+ employees). 
 Status business: A categorical variable describing the legal status of observed company: 
1=sole proprietorship, 2=private limited company, limited by shares (LTD.), 3=public 
Ltd Company (PLC), 4=other. 
 Age business: A categorical variable showing how many years has the observed 
company been trading (this includes under all ownerships and all legal statuses): 1=less 
than 5 years, 2=6 - 10 years, 3=11 - 20 years, 4=more than 20 years. 
 Business locality: A categorical variable describing in what kind of locality does the 
observed company/ firm carry out its main activity: 1=the capital, 2=big city (regional 
centre), 3=small town, 4=village or rural area, 5=the entire country, 6=both inside the 
country and outside the country, or outside the country only. 
 Vat registered: A dummy variable describing whether the respondent's company is VAT 
registered: 0=no, 1=yes. 
For the descriptive analysis we report the crude data for each variable to provide an accurate 
description and to minimise the bias that one would encounter by excluding those employers 
who did not provide responses to all the variables in the analysis but provided responses for 
some questions. In the regression analysis, on the other hand, only those respondents for which 
data on each variable was available for each model were analysed due to the technical 




Examining the surveyed employers, 33.2 per cent never hired a worker without a contract, 40.8 
per cent sometimes did so, 21.8 per cent in most cases did so, and 4.3 per cent always did so 
(see Table 1). This displays how commonly employers employ workers on an unregistered basis 
without a written contract or terms of employment in FYR Macedonia.     
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
However, not all types of employer were equally likely to employ unregistered workers. 
Examining those who in most cases or always employed unregistered workers (i.e., the last two 
columns of Table 1), the finding is that employers in the construction, transport and 
communications, trade and retail sectors are far more likely than those in the health, agriculture 
or service industries to use unregistered workers. So too is this more likely in micro-enterprises 
and small businesses, in sole proprietorship businesses, and in new businesses less than five 
years old, in small towns and villages or rural areas, and in VAT registered businesses.  
 Analysing the policy approaches, Table 1 firstly reveals so far as the rational economic 
actor approach is concerned that there does not appear to be any strong correlation between the 
use of unregistered workers by employers and their perception of the risk of detection. Although 
those perceiving a high risk of detection are less likely to always or in most cases employ 
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unregistered workers, it is not markedly less than those perceiving a low risk of detection. 
Similarly, there is no clear relationship between the use of unregistered workers by employers 
and their perceptions of the expected sanction. Although those who perceive the sanction to be 
nothing serious or a small fine are more likely to employ unregistered workers than those who 
believe that a serious fine would result, those who believe that their company would be forced 
to cease trading are surprisingly markedly more likely to employ unregistered workers.  
 Examining whether the likelihood of employers using unregistered employment is 
correlated with their levels of vertical and horizontal trust, Table 1 firstly reveals that the greater 
their adherence and belief in the formal rules of the game (i.e., the laws and regulations), the 
less likely are they to always or in most cases employ unregistered workers. This appears to be 
strongly correlated. Similarly, those who estimate the share of the informal economy in FYR 
Macedonia as higher are markedly more likely to in most cases or always use unregistered 
workers. Some 38.5 per cent of those who perceive the informal economy to be 50 per cent or 
more of GDP always or in most cases employ unregistered workers compared with just 12.5 
per cent of those who perceive the informal economy to be less than 10 per cent of GNP. 
 These, however, are descriptive statistics. They do not hold constant the other variables 
which may influence these correlations. To do so, Table 2 therefore presents an ordered logit 
regression analysis. This adopts a staged approach. The issue of horizontal trust is included in 
all the models. Model 1 adds the influence of vertical trust, model 2 the risk of detection, model 
3 the expected sanction and model 4 includes all these factors. Before examining the correlation 
between these explanations for employers using unregistered workers, it is first necessary to 
examine the types of business more likely to use unregistered workers when all other variables 
are held constant. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 2 reveals similar results across all models. Compared with the construction industry, 
manufacturing firms are significantly less likely to employ unregistered workers, as is the health 
sector.  Similarly, compared with sole proprietors and micro-enterprises, small businesses are 
significantly less likely to employ unregistered workers, as are private limited companies and 
public limited companies significantly less likely to employ unregistered workers than sole 
proprietorships, possible due to the relative absence of a formal human resource management 
function in such businesses. The age of the business, however, is not significantly associated 
with the likelihood of using unregistered workers. Businesses in small towns, however, are 
significantly less likely to employ unregistered workers than those in the capital city of Skopje 
and larger cities. 
To evaluate firstly the rational economic actor approach, it can be seen in models 3 and 
4 that there is no significant association between the likelihood of employers using unregistered 
workers and the expected sanction for doing so (refuting Hypothesis H1a). Meanwhile, models 
2 and 4 display a weak but significant correlation between the likelihood of employers using 
unregistered workers and the risk of detection. Employers who perceive the probability of 
detection as greater than 60 per cent are significantly less likely to employ unregistered workers 
than those who perceive the probability of detection as less than 30 per cent (confirming 
hypothesis H1b).  
Secondly, and evaluating the social actor explanation, there is firstly a strong significant 
association between the level of vertical trust and the likelihood of employers using 
unregistered workers. The lower the level of vertical trust (measured by employers’ tolerance 
of those who engage in the informal economy, or what is her called tax morale), the significantly 
greater is the likelihood of the employer using unregistered workers (confirming Hypothesis 
H2a). An increase in the tax morale index by one unit increases the share of employers always 
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hiring workers without a contract by 0.5 percentage points. This reinforces previous work on 
this subject regarding the wider informal economy (Williams and Franic 2015; Williams and 
Horodnic 2015a,b,c, 2017; Williams et al. 2015).  
Similarly, it is shown across all models that there is a strong significant association 
between the level of horizontal trust and the likelihood of employers using unregistered 
workers. The lower the level of horizontal trust (measured by the employers estimate of the 
share of the informal economy in the country), the significantly greater is the likelihood of the 
employer using unregistered workers (confirming Hypothesis H2b). An employer who 
estimates that the probability of being caught for under-reporting its number of employees is 
over 60 per cent has a 1.9 percentage points lower probability of always hiring unregistered 
workers than an employer who estimates that this probability is less than 30 per cent. 
      
Discussion and Conclusions 
 
To explain why employers use unregistered workers and how this illegal employment practice 
can be tackled, this paper has evaluated both a rational economic actor explanation which views 
employers as using unregistered workers when the benefits outweigh the costs, and an emergent 
social actor approach which explains employers as using unregistered workers when they lack 
both vertical trust (i.e., their norms, values and beliefs are not in symmetry with the laws and 
regulations) and horizontal trust (i.e., they believe many others are being non-compliant). 
Reporting a 2015 survey of 450 employers in FYR Macedonia, the finding is that although there 
is no association between employers using unregistered workers and the perceived level of 
penalties, and only a weak significant association with the probability of detection, there is a 
strong significant association with both the level of vertical and horizontal trust. Those whose 
norms differ to the laws and regulations, display a significantly greater likelihood of employing 
unregistered workers, as do those who perceive a larger proportion of the population to be 
engaged in the informal economy.  
In terms of theoretical advances therefore, this paper makes four major contributions. 
Firstly, despite numerous studies explaining participation in the wider informal economy, few 
studies have sought to explain unregistered employment and how this can be tackled. Secondly, 
most studies explaining participation in the informal economy have focused upon employees 
and few have evaluated employers’ reasons. This paper has filled these two lacunae. Thirdly, 
by revealing that there is no association between employers using unregistered workers and the 
perceived level of penalties, and only a weak significant association with the probability of 
detection, but a strong association between vertical trust and participation in unregistered 
employment, it confirms the usefulness of an institutional theory lens. The greater the degree 
of asymmetry between the laws and regulations of formal institutions and the norms, values 
and beliefs of employers, the greater is the prevalence of unregistered employment. Fourth and 
finally, and importantly for advancing institutional theory, the finding is that there is a strong 
association between horizontal trust and the likelihood of employers using unregistered 
workers. This is a novel finding not before revealed.  
In terms of policy implications therefore, the finding is that tackling unregistered 
employment will require a shift away from treating employers primarily as rational economic 
actors. Increasing the penalties for employing unregistered workers is not related to the 
propensity to do so, and even if increasing the probability of detection is significantly related 
to the propensity for employers to use unregistered workers, it is a weak association. Instead, 
there is a need to recognise that employers are primarily social actors. There is a strong 
significant association between employers using unregistered workers and their lack of both 
vertical trust (i.e., their norms, values and beliefs do not align with the formal laws and 
regulations) and horizontal trust (i.e., they believe many other employers are employing 
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unregistered workers). To tackle unregistered employment, therefore, increasing the level of 
deterrents will have little impact, while measures that improve the social contract between the 
government and employers (i.e., improving vertical trust) will have a significant impact. On the 
one hand, this can be achieved by changing employers’ norms, values and beliefs regarding the 
acceptability of using unregistered workers, using education and awareness raising campaigns. 
However, it is unlikely that this will be effective unless formal institutions themselves change. 
On the other hand, therefore, there is also a need to change the formal institutions, such as by 
eradicating public sector corruption and improving procedural and distributive justice and 
fairness (Horodnic 2018; Horodnic and Williams 2018; Molero and Pujol 2012; Murphy 2005; 
Williams and Horodnic 2015a). There is also a need to improve horizontal trust. To do so, 
information on their peers might be provided to employers. Many employers believe that the 
informal economy is larger than most measurements find. Contrary to what is often the case, 
therefore, governments could actively publicise the high level of employer compliance. Studies 
of UK taxpayers reveal that such messages have a strong significant impact on increasing 
compliance (Hallsworth et al, 2017).   
This paper, nevertheless, has limitations. First, it is based on just one country. Future 
studies, therefore, could evaluate whether similar findings are identified when conducting 
employer surveys in other Central and Eastern European countries. Second, and importantly, 
although this study reveals that the propensity of employers to use unregistered workers is 
significantly associated with their levels of vertical and horizontal trust, it does not uncover the 
reasons for this lack of vertical and horizontal trust. Future quantitative as well as in-depth 
qualitative research could be conducted, therefore, to find out these reasons, including which 
formal institutions lead to low levels of vertical trust, and why a lack of horizontal trust prevails, 
so that targeted policy measures can be pursued to improve the level of trust between employers 
as well as between employers and government. 
In sum, this paper has revealed the importance of the “social actor” approach in both 
explaining as well as tackling the propensity of employers to use unregistered workers, and the 
need for a shift away from “rational economic actor” explanations and the associated deterrence 
approach that seeks to increase the penalties and probability of detection. If this paper stimulates 
similar research to be conducted in other countries as well as more in-depth research on the 
reasons for the lack of vertical and horizontal trust, then it will have fulfilled one of its 
intentions. If this then leads to a reconsideration of how unregistered employment is tackled, 
and to greater emphasis being put on tackling the low the levels of vertical and horizontal trust 
that lead to higher levels of unregistered employment, then it will have fulfilled its wider 
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Total 33.2 40.8 21.8 4.3 
Sector     
 Agriculture 31.3 50.0 12.5 6.3 
 Hotels and restaurants 13.8 75.9 6.9 3.5 
 Services 34.0 50.0 8.0 8.0 
 Construction 16.0 36.0 40.0 8.0 
 Transport and communications 47.4 21.1 23.7 7.9 
 Trade 20.6 38.4 41.1 0.0 
 Retail 31.4 34.3 28.6 5.7 
 Industry 46.0 36.0 14.0 4.0 
 Health 57.1 39.3 3.6 0.0 
 Other 43.8 50.0 6.3 0.0 
Number of employees     
 Sole proprietor’s and micro (0-9 
employees) 
32.9 41.3 21.5 4.4 
 Small (10-49 employees) 25.6 38.5 30.8 5.1 
 Medium and large (50+ employees) 66.7 33.3 0.0 0.0 
Status business     
 Sole proprietorship 12.7 41.3 41.3 4.8 
 
Private limited company, limited by 
shares (LTD.) 
32.7 41.5 21.2 4.6 
 Public Ltd Company (PLC) 46.2 41.0 10.3 2.6 
 Other 45.0 50.0 0.0 5.0 
Age business     
 Less than 5 years 28.8 41.3 21.3 8.8 
 6 - 10 years 36.8 36.8 23.9 2.6 
 11 - 20 years 29.7 46.1 21.9 2.3 
 More than 20 years 39.7 38.2 16.2 5.9 
Estimated share     
 Less than 10% 53.1 34.4 12.5 0.0 
 10 to 20% 42.7 45.1 9.8 2.4 
 21 to 30% 39.5 44.4 16.1 0.0 
 31 to 50% 22.8 39.6 30.7 6.9 
 50% or more 24.2 37.4 30.3 8.1 
Business locality     
 The capital 52.5 39.0 5.1 3.4 
 Big city (regional centre) 35.8 39.1 21.7 3.4 
 Small town 15.9 42.0 37.7 4.4 
 Village or rural area 27.3 36.4 27.3 9.1 
 The entire country 16.1 54.8 19.4 9.7 
 
Both inside the country and outside 
the country, or outside the country 
only 
38.9 38.9 16.7 5.6 
Vat registered     
 No 36.4 40.9 15.2 7.6 
 Yes 31.5 41.4 23.3 3.8 
Tax morale     
 1 and 2 34.5 42.9 18.1 4.4 
 3 and 4 44.6 41.1 14.3 0.0 
 5 and 6 23.2 35.7 33.9 7.1 
 7 and 8 7.7 50.0 38.5 3.9 
15 
 
 9 and 10 20.0 26.7 46.7 6.7 
Detection risk     
 Less than 30% 36.6 36.6 21.8 4.9 
 30 to 60% 27.2 41.8 28.2 2.9 
 More than 60% 34.0 45.1 16.7 4.2 
Expected sanction     
 Nothing serious or a small fine 36.2 32.4 24.8 6.7 
 
A serious fine that would affect the 
competitiveness of the company 
29.9 45.8 22.6 1.7 
 
A serious fine that would put the 
company at risk of insolvency 
38.4 43.0 15.1 3.5 
 
The company would be forced to 
cease operations 
25.9 33.3 25.9 14.8 






Table 2. Likelihood of unregistered employment, ordered logit regression 
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Sole proprietorship) 













































Age business (RC: 
Less than 5 years) 
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Detection risk (RC: 
Less than 30%) 
        
 30 to 60%   
-0.300 
(0.275) 




 More than 60%   
-0.463 
(0.261)* 





(RC: Nothing serious 
or a small fine) 
        
 
A serious fine that 
would affect the 
competitiveness of 
the company 








A serious fine that 
would put the 
company at risk of 
insolvency 









would be forced to 
cease operations 









359 366 372 354 
Pseudo R2 0.111 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Prob > F 0.000 0.108 0.106 0.114 
Notes: (1) Dependent variable: “Hiring a worker without a contract” measured on a four-point scale (1=Never; 2=Sometimes; 
3=In most cases; 4=Always) 
(2) We report the marginal effects for the highest score of the dependent variable (4) 
(3) The lower the tax morale index value, the higher is the tax morale, and vice versa 
(4) Significance: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
(5) Source: Authors’ own work based on the GREY Survey in FYROM 
 
